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The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and 
information concerning the development and improvement of the 
professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
*+*+*+*+*+*+*+* 
liThe uneven and varying treatment of men in ships is one of the 
chief causes of dissatisfaction, as well as the manner of ratings, 
pay, etc •••• Men must be treated differently, rated by boards 
of officers, broken only by courts martial, better paid, and the 
service of the Government be made an honor for them as well as 
for the officers •••• We use new inventions because of some 
saving of time and labor in the attainment of an end, though we 
know the value of many old methods. If one refused to adopt new 
methods, or to adapt onels self to the new conditions, so much the 
-ur 
worse for the man or the nation.... If a modern ship-of-war can om 
annihilate a whole fleet of old time frigates, in just s~ mucb2: __ . 'I) _ 
must the personnel be Improved. We must come to this soQn~r §t la'teF!.-r.,. 
The officers and men must approach nearer each other; th~ ~n-!9 
know more - a higher type - and the officer to apply his~~ haRd 
to the plow on occas ions, to teach and as an examp 1 e. II c.D rn ~ 
.+:>-< l.-'-' _ 
Surgeon C. A. Siegfried, USN in his discussion of Rear Admiral S. B. ~r 
Lucels article "Naval Training", U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, 
March 1, 1890 
FEATURE: REVITALIZATION OF PROFESSIONALISM, A CHALLENGE (PART I I) 
Today cries for this idealistic revitalization of professionalism echo across the 
editorial pages and are the focus of countless articles in numerous service-oriented and 
government publications. The services actually began their drive for increased profession-
alism over four years ago when the Presidentls Commission on All-Volunteer Armed Force 
was formed. The end of the draft would be a time when the services had to be able to attract 
multitudes of new recruits and at the same time be able to retain a good percentage of 
tt se who enlisted. The Navyls revitalization was begun in 1970 when Admiral E. R. ZUMWALT, 
Jr. commenced his present tenure as Chief of Naval Operations. His Z-Grams which first 
appeared in July of 1970 and continue today have been one of the most controversial issues. 
In the Navy since its shift from sails to steam propulsion. 
The intent or purpose of these policy changes was summarized in Z-93 in July 1971 and 
reemphasized in Z-117 in November 1972. In answer to critics inside the Navy and out that 
his policies had fostered permissiveness, Admiral ZUMWALT outlined four principal challenges 
for the Navy in the 1970 1 s. For people his objectives included a more satisfying working 
environment, a better opportunity for family life, and meaningful careers. For Navy leaders 
his objectives Included strong personal integrity, dedication, and understanding of the 
people they lead and the tasks they undertake. In the area of social change the elimination 
of drug abuse and racial discrimination and the improvement of the environment were his 
targets. National security goals at such high standards of material readiness and integration 
of men and mission are the primary reasons for the existence of the Navy and the other 
armed services. CNO felt that onels experiences each day should reinforce a sense of worth 
lias a valued member of a truly effective Navy; engender confidence and truslt in those persons 
In positions of authority; and provide him with opportunity for proud accomplishment and 
professional contrlbutlon". 
~ ' .. 
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In addition to the problems of recruiting and retention a host of other personnel 
difficulties now plague this revitalization effort. The after shocks of the personnel 
turbulence caused by the Vietnam war are still being felt in the current PCS log jam. The 
lengthening of tours and increased care in the management of personnel funds is the present 
scheme for solving the immediate needs of the future. The skyrocketing costs of Navy 
manpower have assisted in keeping retention and recruitment rates near desired levels or 
at least improving but these costs are about 45 percent of the entire budget. Even 
though pay scales comparable to those of most civilians and special incentive bonuses 
are essential to the Navy's personnel program, the hardware authorizations suffer for a 
lack of sufficient funds. The slowing of promotions due to grade "creep", the proposed 
military retirement system, the present flight pay controversy and the congressional pressure 
to reduce/eliminate commissary, exchange and medical benefits all with no easy solution, 
exert a great deal of negative influence in an atmosphere in which increased professionalism 
is to be developed. 
To carry us through these tough times of anti-military sentiment and internal problems 
pride in the service must be established in the individual commands by action and example. 
Some critics of Admiral ZUMWALT's policies feel that now is the time to make sweeping changes 
and end the "permissiveness" considered to be the basis of our problems. In the October 
1973 issue of the U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, a retired veteran of 33 years naval 
service, Commander Warren F. Postel, has this to say about the Navy today: 
"There is much concern today about the present state of the Navy. The low point 
probably was reached during the period of excessive permissiveness in an unpopular conflict 
with a "no-win" objective, the rioting, and the near mutiny in San Diego. I have confidence 
in the future of the Navy. I am sure there are still enough really dedicated people remain-
ing who will get things back on an even keel. We have had enough of the experiments in 
premissiveness, in human relations, in social consciousness, in the pay structure, and in 
habitability. We need to return to the fundamentals that made our Navy great. As I see it, 
these are, command authority and respect, without any compromises, just but strict discipline, 
personal neatness and military bearing, and a devotion to the Navy and our nation." I 
believe Commander Postel fails to realize the complexity of the personnel situation and tends 
to simplify his solution accordingly. In Z-117 CNO also reiterates this need to preserve 
good order and discipline throughout the naval service. This responsibility exists at all 
levels and I feel that opposition to the Z-grams has resulted in apathy; this indifference 
has resulted in the carrying out of some of these programs to the letter If at all, totally 
ignoring the true spirit or intent of Z-93 discussed earlier. 
A recent Westinghouse Study, Potential Impacts of Cultural Change ~ the Navy.!!!. the 
1970'" discusses a leadership study completed by the U.S. Army War College. It was noted 
that great efforts were made between World War I and World War II to identify "traits of 
leadership". Behavioral science has about abandoned the "trait" approach, especially in 
formal organizations. Research of 40 years failed to uncover any set of unique leadership 
traits or qualities that are invariant. Some have strong positive effects in one situation, 
but strong negative results in other situations. Behavior "depends on the situation". The 
claim that recent polic~ changes are experiments is a sign of inability to adapt to changing 
situations. We can never cast out the principles of discipline and authority that are 
essential to our mission and existence, but we must learn or realize the fact that the people 
who man our complex, computerized, 'highly sophisticated ships and aircraft are not the same 
drunkards or hoodlums that were "recruited" when our Navy began. Since the men who must 
lead and serve in the Navy come from society we must adapt our ideas and policies to the 
times that we live in. In an October 1973 ARMY magazine article U.S. Army Chief of Staff,; 
General Creighton W. ABRAMS, states, 
lilt has been my observation that senior commanders are often surprised at how well 
their Juniors operate when given appropriate freedom. When it frees junior leaders, the 
chain of command multiplies and enriches their effectiveness. Our readiness to fight 
depends upon the professional ability, experience and self-confidence of all our leaders, 
but especially our junior commissioned and non-commissioned ones, and on strong and responsi~e 
bonds of support and encouragement in the chain of command." 
Regardless of reams of thetoric and accusations the real challenge for the Navy still 
exists. I feel that throughout the Navy at all levels the individual commands are the key 
to meeting thIs challenge. Essential to these commands are adaptability to changing 
situations, and freedom to solve their problems and meet their requirements. Discipline 
and authority are essential today as they have been throughout our Navy's history, but 
flexible, adaptable leadership free to act at all levels is the key to the revitalization 
of our professionalism. 
R. J. BRANCO 
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SERVICE NOTE 
The Pentagon Is requestIng nearly $1.7 billion for the Trrdent program in the budget 
now before Congress. Of thIs total $657 mi 11 ion would 'be for . research and development, 
$868 million for shIp construction (the lead submarIne and long lead-time components 
for three additional ones), and $129 millIon for the new base at Bangor, Wash. 
As envisioned today, Trident will be a 10-ship program costing $12,780,900,000. The 
total cost of the submarines would be $5,128,700,000. The first one, Including one-time 
design work and construction spares, will cost an estimated $780.8 million. The other nine 
will carry a pricetag of $483.1 million each. 
The Trident I (C-4) missile will be built first, time for completion In late 1978 
concurrent with the first of the new submarines, which will be larger, faster, and much 
quieter than the Polaris/Poseidon ships they will supplement and then succeed. The 4,000 
mile missile could be backfitted Into Poseidon submarines If the requirement arises. The 
Polaris A-3 and Poseidon missiles have a normal range of up to 2,500 nautical miles. Later 
on, the Trident" (D-S) .. :missfle wIll be built. It will have a range of about 6,000 nautical 
miles. The greater reach of the missile, the larger the operating area for the submarine 
from which it can still reach its targets and the greater survivability potential for it. 
In the face of criticism to slow-down the program, the Navy contends that a 1978 target 
date provides for orderly replacement of its fleet ballistic missile submarine forces with 
a quieter, bigger (24 missile tubes as against 16 for Polaris/Poseidon), faster, and better 
equipped (much improved sonar, for example) submarine. It points out, too, that the first 
Polaris submarine will be 19 years old by the time the first Trident goes to sea on patrol. 
As Vice Admiral H. G. RICKOVER has observed, the Russians already have their "Trldent" 
in the form of a new 4,000 mile missile, a dozen of which are installed in their new Delta-
class submarine, the first of whIch has already been deployed. 
With this weapons system, the Delta submarine could sit at the pier at the Sverdolinksk 
base in the northern USSR and wipe out New York, Boston, Chicago, Philadephia, and a number 
of other U.S. citIes. 
The AdministratIon believes that putting Tri~ent into full production will not only 
modernize and improve the nation's number one nuclear-war deterrent but will also encourage 
the Soviets to agree to a reasonable and mutually beneficial treaty to limit offensive 
armaments. President Nixon and Chairman Leonid Brezhnev both have voiced hopes for a SALT I I 
pact within a year. The present interim agreement, worked out in SALT I and signed in 
May 1972, expires in 1977. 
The fact that the Soviets recently demonstrated a MIRV capability for their ICBMs has 
strengthened the Pentagon's confidence in its predictions that the USSR will also MIRV its 
submarine-launced ballistIc missiles (SLBMs). This, in turn, increases the importance of 
getting on wIth the job of improving the U.S. fleet ballistic missile force, as is clearly 
permitted under SALT I. 
(SEA POWER, OCTOBER 1973) 
